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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between U.S. corporations'
management of their pension plans and their management of the more familiar
aspects of corporate financial structure. The chief conclusion, on the
basis of data for 7,828 pension plans sponsored by 1,836 companies and their
subsidiaries, is that corporations do not manage the pension plans which they
sponsor as if these plans had nothing to do with the corporation. Different
responses appear to characterize firms' behavior in different contexts, but
the evidence persistently indicates clear relationships between decisions
about pension assets and liabilities and decisions about the other assets
and liabilities of the firm.Atthe same time, the pattern of these relation-
ships is, more often than not, inconsistent with familiar hypotheses that
have emerged thus far in the theoretical literature analyzing pension aspects
of corporate finance. Hence the conclusion from the data is also that the
connections between pension decisions and corporate financial decisions
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Private pension fundsnowconstitute one of the largest pools of
investmentassets in the United States. Their total assets exceed $300
billion, and for the foreseeable future they are almost certain to grow
still further in relation to the overall size of the U.S. financial markets.
These funds already comprise by far the largest major category of institu-
tional investor in the U.S. corporate equity market, and the second largest
(after the life insurance industry) in the corporate bond market. As
private pension funds continue to account for a steadily growing share
of these key markets, their behavior becomes increasingly important to
the understanding of how the U.S. financial markets determine the yields
on, and prices of, financial assets.
At the same time, both the assets held by private pension plans and
these plans' liabilities for future benefit payments are now large —and
growing —inrelation to the non—pension assets and liabilities of the U.S.
private business sector. Many major corporations' pension assets and
pension liabilities represent substantial fractions of the net worth of
the company, and in some cases even bulk large in comparison to the
company's total assets. Because corporate equity shares therefore
represent ownership claims on two pools of assets, and obligations via
two sets of liabilities, shareholders clearly have a direct interest in
the company's pension plan in addition to the quantities that appear on—2—
its balance sheet. The larger are the assets andliabilitiesof the
company's pension plan, the greater is their role, along with the non—
pensionassets andliabilities,indetermining the sponsoring company's
overallrisk—return prospects. Hence private pension plans increasingly
matter not just for employees but for corporations' shareholders arid,
in theevent of default, corporations' creditors.
Thegrowing importance of pension plans' assets and liabilities
for nearly all constituencies within a typical corporation raises the
possibility that the corporation's overall financial position arid prospects
may influence its strategy for funding its pension liabilities, as
well as its subsequent allocation of these fundsamong alternative invest-
mentassets,in any of a number of ways. Companies may useunfunded
pensionliabilities as a substitute for credit market debt, or alternatively
to extend overall indebtedness in conjunction with credit market debt.
Similarly, companies may invest pension assets so as to mitigate, or
alternatively to compound, the leverage and otherrisk—determining
characteristicsof their business. Then, too, there may be no connection
at all —perhaps because managements feel a responsibility to subordinate
the corporation's interest in its pension plan to the interests of the
plan's beneficiaries.
Moreover, as private pension assets and liabilities continue to
grow in relation to thebalance sheet of the typical corporation, the
possibilityarises that the connection between corporate finance and
pensions may be as relevant for understanding the former as the latter.
If companies face limitations on the management of their pension assets
and liabilities (as they do under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income
Security Act), or if the treatmentfortax purposes of any specific asset—3—
orliability depends on whether it falls within the pension (as it
does under the current U.S. Tax Code), thenthedesired positioning
ofthecompany'sconsolidated pension plan andbalancesheet maynot
beattainable solely through actions executed in the pension plan. In
such circumstances companies maytakeat least somefeaturesof (or
constraints on) the pension planasgiven inmaking decisions about the
structureof their other assets andliabilities.More generally, a
companymay actso as to determine the structure of itspensionplan
andthatof its balance sheet jointly.
The object of this paper is to test empirically for interrelation-
ships along just these lines between U.S. corporations' management of
their pension plans and their management of the more familiar aspects
of corporate financial structure. (e motivation underlying this effort
isto subject to empirical scrutiny some of the theoretical hypotheses
that have already emerged in the nascent literature of private pensions
and corporate finance. In addition, the goal is to examine the data
morebroadly, to allow other regularities to appear which may be suggestive
in the further development of theory describing these aspects of corpora-
tions' financial behavior.
Because of the overwhelming heterogeneity of bothpensionarrange-
ments and financial structure within the U.S. corporate business sector,
as well as the profusion of powerful economic, regulatory, and other
institutional influences that have shaped the pension and general corporate
financial environments in recent years, any attempt to conduct such an
investigation using aggregated time-series data would be of limited value.
Instead, the analysis undertaken here relies on individual company data
assembled from the pension plan information that each plan sponsor—4—
provides to the Internal RevenueService and the U.S. Department of Labor
on Form 5500, used in conjunction with additional conventional individual
company financial statistics contained in the Standard andPoor's
Compustatfile. The pension data are for planyear 1977, the only year
forwhich a nearly complete Form 5500 file exists as of the timeof
writing.
Section I describes the data and indicates the procedures used
for such steps as within-firm aggregation of multiple pension plans,
merging of the Form 5500 and Compustat files, and treatment of corporate
parent—subsidiary relationships. Section II, which focuses on pension
funding strategy, presents the results of a series of tests for relation-
ships between corporations' funding of their pension liabilities (the
total of which is taken as given here) and other characteristics of the
respective firms' business and balance sheet (also taken as given).
Section III, also on pension funding strategy, digresses to examine the
results of tests of the familiar hypothesis that corporations' decisions
inthis regard are oriented not to achieving fundamental financial
objectives but to smoothing their reported earnings statements over time.
Section IV, which focuses onpension asset allocations, presents the
results of a series of tests for relationships betweencorporations'
investmentof their pension assets (the total of which is taken as
given here) and other characteristics of thefirm's business andbalance
sheet(also taken as given).Section V generalizes the line of investiga-
tion pursuedin Section II by presenting results of tests for a joint
relationship between pension funding strategy and the corporation's
balance sheet, thereby allowing for the possibility that balance sheet—5—
decisionsmaynotbe predetermined with respect to pension funding
decisions. Section VIbrieflysununarizes the paper's principal conclusions,
highlightssome important caveats, and indicates directions for potential
future research.I. The Data
The Employee Retirement IncomeSecurityAct of 1974 requires each
pension benefit plan sponsored by a U.S. corporation to file a report
ann,with the InternalRevenue Service andtheDepartment ofLabor,
on Form 5500 (or Form 5500-C if the plan covers 100 or fewer participants).
The form includes information about the plan's benefit structure, the
number and current status of the participants in the plan, the plan's
income and expenses for the year, and the plan's beginning—of—year and
end—of—year assets broken down into a substantial detail of investment
categories. Each defined benefit plan must also file Form 5500 Schedule B,
which provides actuarialinformation about the plan's accruedliabilities,
includingits vested andnon-vestedliabilities separately, together with
other related items. The Appendix shows the format of Form 5500 and
Schedule B.
The 1977 Employee Benefit Plan SampleFilecontains all 29,120 Form
5500 returnssubmitted forplan year 1977 and processed bythe Internal
RevenueService between July 1,1978,and June 30, 1979.1 Those returns
constituted77.5% of the Form 5500 returns ultimately submitted for plan
year 1977. The 22.5% of the returns that are missing from the file are
heavily concentrated among smaller plans (as measured by asset size), how-
ever.2 Of the 29,120 returns included in thefile, 4,694 either pertained
toplans sponsored by non—profit organizationsor reported zero assets.
Theremaining 24,426 returnsformthe basic sample used in this paper.
Table1shows the distribution of assets across this saxile of
24,426 plans. The combined assets for all 24,426 totaled $222 billion.3




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ofthe plans. Nearly one-half of the plans had less than $1 million in
assets, andmorethan four-fifths had less than $5 million. By contrast,
the 22 plans with more than $1 billion in assets together accounted for
almost one-fifth of the total, and the 55 plans with more than $500 million
together accounted for almost one-third.4
Because manycompaniessponsor more than one pension plan —one
plan for salaried staff and another for wage earners, for example —the
24,426 plans in the sample represented only 15,098 sponsoring corporations.5
For purposes of testing hypotheses about relationships between pension asset
and liability decisions and corporate financial behavior in the conventional
sense, what presumably matters is not the assets or liabilities of any one
of a corporation's pension plans but the combined assets and liabilities
of all plans that it sponsors. Table 2 shows the distribution of the $222
billion in total assets across the 15,098 sponsoring firms in the sample.
As is to be expected, aggregating all plans sponsored by a single firm shifts
the distribution toward larger assets for each observation, although the
effect is quantitatively small.
The most common form of pension plan in the United States is the
definedbenefit plan, but other forms (primarily the defined contribution
plan) exist as well. The distinction is relevant because the concept of
pension"liabilities" has meaning only for defined benefit plans. For the
same reason, shareholders in a corporation have no direct financial interest
in how the assets of a defined contribution plan perform. Of the 24,426
plans in Table 1, 16,200 sponsored by 10,470 different companies, and
with $165 billion in assets, were defined benefit plans. Nevertheless,
856 of these plans failed to file Schedule B in time for the Internal
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































return, before June 30, 1979. The remaining 15,344 plans, sponsored by
9,899 companies, reported $152 billion in cnbined assets, Table 3 shows
the distribution of these assets across the 9,899 firms.
The information contained in Form 5500 is insufficient, of course,
to facilitate tests of hypotheses aboutrelationshipsbetween pension asset
andliabilitydecisions andcorporatefinance decisions in the conventional
sense. Some source of information about each sponsoring company's balance
sheet, as well as its income statement and other aspects of its financial
situation, is also necessary. Because many of the 15,098 companies sponsoring
pension plans included in the 1977 Form 5500 sample are either small or
closely held, however, obtaining such information on a comprehensive basis
would be impractical if not impossible. By contrast, most of the larger
companiesare included in the Standard & Poor'sCompustat file. A systematic
search,based on a computer procedure supplemented with "by hand" inspection,
revealed1,690 corporations included in the Compustat file that were sponsors
of 5,788 pension plans included in the 1977 Form 5500 sample.6
Even so, simply matching Compustat firms with pension plan sponsors
wouldstill be inadequate.The Compustat file reports balance sheets and
earnings statements for each included corporation on a consolidated basis
—that is, including all of the corporation's wholly owned subsidiaries.
Fromthe perspective of analyzing corporate financial behavior at thelevel
of the relationships posited in this investigation, consolidation is pres.un-
ablythecorrect procedure. Matching Compustat firmswithpension plan
sponsorswould be inadequate, therefore, without also consolidating plans
sponsored by each Compustat firm with plans sponsored by its subsidiaries
(ifany).A laborious "by hand" search indeed revealed that 593Compustat





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pension plans included in the 1977 Form 5500 sample.7 Of the 593 Compustat
firmssponsoring pension plans through subsidiaries, 447 also sponsored
one or more plans directly.
The fully aggregated and consolidated sample available for use in
testing for relationships between pension decisions and corporate financial
decisionstherefore consists of 7,828 pension plans (including defined
benefit as well as other typeplans,and,amongdefined benefit plans,
those that did and did not file Schedule B), with $153 billion in combined
assets, sponsored by 1,836 consolidated companies.8 Table 4 shows the
distributionof the $153billion of assets across the 1,836 firms.Of
the 7,828 plans sponsored by consolidated Coxnpustat companies, 5,836 were
defined benefit plans, of which 5,670 filed Schedule B in time for Internal
RevenueService processing. Table 5 shows the distribution of these 5,670
plans' $110 billion of assets across the plans' 1,552 sponsoring firms.
A comparison of Tables 2 and 4,and of Tables 3 and5,showsthat the result
of not only consolidating subsidiaries into parent companies but also
excluding all plansnot sponsored by a Compustat firm (even through a sub-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































II. Pension Funding Strategy
In the most abstract conception of the incorporated firm, the assets
andliabilitiesof a corporation's defined benefit pension plan(s) are
just like the assets and liabilities that appear on its balance sheet.
Shareholders own both sets of assets, and they are responsible (to the
extent of their equity) for both sets of liabilities. Whether the firm's
managementacts so as to maximize the share price, to maximize expected
profits, or to achieveyet some other objective, there is no need to dis-
tinguish between one pooi of assets and theother, or between one group of
liabilitiesand the other.
Such an abstraction may fail to describe the world of U.S. corpora-
tions and their sponsored pension plans for several well-known reasons.'°
At the most practical level, the firm's flexibility on the pension liability
side is usually severely limited. Conventions of labor market practice,
reinforced by legal requirements and often by collective bargaining agree-
ments, restrict the range within which a firm and its workers can divide
total laborcostsbetween current and deferred compensation. To the extent
that the firm's basic pension liabilities are predetermined from the perspec-
tive of financial decision making, therefore, its choice of pension
"liabilities" in this context refers only to that part of the basic actuarial
liabilityin excess of the amountof assets coimitted to the pension fund.
Hence decisions about pension "liabilities" in this sense are really decisions
about pension assets. Moreover, the firm's flexibility is limited here too,
in that its pension funding position must meet standards specified by the
nployee Retirement Income Security Act
Whollyapart fran such constraints, a variety of considerations may
lead the firm to see pension assets and liabilities as less than perfect—11—
substitutes for its other assets andliabilities.First, the implicit
costof "borrowing" by less thanfullyfunding pension liabilities need
not beidentical, either before or after taxes, to the explicit cost of
borrowingin the credit market.In the extreme, the former "source of
funds"maybeavailable at times when the latter is not. Evenunderordinary
circumstances,thescheduling of the "debt service" associated with the
twokinds of liabilities may differ in important ways. Aseconddistinction
is that pension liabilities, unlike the firm's other liabilities in most
circumstances, are insured in a way that limits the firm's exposure. The
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation insures corporations' pension liabil-
ities in full but, in the event of default, has a claim on only one-third
of the firm's assets. The tax treatment of pension plans provides a third
reason why the simple abstraction, in which one asset or liability is just
like any other, may not apply to actual corporations. Payments of funds
into the pension plan are deductible from the firm's income for tax pur-
poses, and earnings on assets held in the pension plan are excluded from
taxable income. Finally —althoughthese four factors do not exhaust
the possible reasons for distinguishing pension versusotherassets
and liabilities —shareholdersand potential shareholders maybe more
fullyaware of that part of a firm's liabilities which actually appears
onits balancesheet.12
Forall of these familiarreasons,therefore, a corporation may not
behaveasif it is indifferent between pensionandother assets, or between
pension and other liabilities. Hence instead of the usual networth constraint
TA-TL=NW (1)—12—
whereTA and TL are the firm's total assets and total liabilities,
respectively, and NW is net worth (assi.mted to be predetermined as of any
specifictime),themore relevant expression is
PA+BA-PL--BL =NW (2)
where PA and PL distinguish the assets and liabilities of the firm's defined
benefit pension plan(s), while BA and BL represent the assets and liabilities
that appear on the firm's balance sheet.13
If the firmwerefree to choose simultaneously each of these four
quantities, subject only to the net worth constraint, then its consolidated




whereX is a vector ofexternal factors determining the firm's responses,
Ctisa vector of coefficients summing to unity, andBis a matrix of
coefficients with zero column sums. The most familiar empirical application
ofthis conception is in a time—series context, in which Xwould include
primarily (often exclusively) the expected yields on the respective assets
and1iabilities. By contrast, in a cross—section context the elements of
X are firm—specific factors that are taken to be predetermined with respect
to the firm'sportfolio choice in the one time period underobservation,
and that(at least potentially) influence that choice. To theextentthat
some of the firm's portfolio choices are predetermined with respect to
others,however, some of theelementswithin theleft—handside of (3)—13—
belongmore properlyon the right. If the firmdecideson its pension
assets and liabilities only secondarily, after deciding on its other
liabilities,thenPAandPL maydepend onBA and BLaswell as the other
factorsincluded within X.
Onequestionthat immediatelyarises in this context is whether
firms havefixed targets for their total liabilities (PTJ +BL)so that
theytake on fewer pension liabilities as they have more liabilities on
their balance sheets or, alternatively, whether they systematically use
PL and BL together to achieve greater or lesser total leverage. Put in
another way, the question is whether the firm treats pension liabilities
and other liabilities as substitutes or conlements, although the sense
of substitutability versus complementarity involved here differs somewhat
from the usual one in which vector X includes specific time—varying yields
associated with PL and BL.
The evidence from the 1977 Form 5500 sample is consistent with




forthe sample of all consolidated Compustat firms with defined benefit
plansfiling Schedule B yields y =.17,with t—statistic 7.8 =.04).14
Forthe subsample in which each firm's pension plan is sufficiently impor-
tant in its overall structure that pension liabilities amount to at least
3%of the firm's totalassets,the result is y =.26,with t—statistic
6.4(R2=.07).For the further subsample in which PL/TA >.10,the
resultis y =.50,with t—statistic = .17).—14—
Furtheranalysis that controls for other influences in the spirit
of(3), while maintaining the assumption that BL is predetermined with
respect to PL, supports this conclusion. Table 6 reports estimation results
for a series of regressions of the form
PL EL = (5)
whereX is, in turn, each of a series of variables describing the firm and
its operating environment. ice again, the positive relationship between
pension and other liabilities (both scaled by net worth) holds up regardless
of the choice of additional controlling variable.
The specific results for the partial effects of the several controlling
variables are also interesting in some cases. Neither the growth rate nor
thetrend-adjusted variability of the firm's earnings had a significant
effecton its pension liabilities. The 1977 rate of return on assets
affected pension liabilities positively, but the mean rate of return over
the past ten years did not. The negative effect of the volatility of rate
of return was marginally significant in the full sample, but not in the
subsample with large pension liabilities relative to the firm's total assets.
The firm's tax status had no significant effect. As would be expected, the
firm's labor intensiveness affected pension liabilities positively, arid the
fraction of the firm's pension plan participants who were still employed
affected pension liabilities negatively; but both effects were significant
in the full sample only.
The failure of so many basic aspects of the firm's risk and return
situation to affect its pension liabilities supports the suggestion, made
above,thatthe firm does not actually choose PL in the usual portfolioTABLE 6
RELATIONSHIP BEEEN PENSION LIABILITIES AND OTHER LIABILITIES
Ful]. Sample PL/TA ￿..10Subsanle
Control Variable _____ 8
p(EBIT) .17 .32 .51 —.46
(7.5) (0.4) (7.6) (—0.2)
a(EBIT) .17 .14 .51 1.20
(7.5) (0.4) (7.9) (1.1)
ElBA .20 .60 .55 1.15
(6.7) (3.1) (6.8) (2.0)
.16 .17 .46 .20
(5.6) (0.6) (6.0) (0.2)
aCE/BA) .15 —.81 .46 —.46
(6.1) (—1.9) (6.8) (—0.3)
p(T/E) .15 .00 .46 .06
(6.5) (0.4) (6.9) (1.0)
p(L/S) .20 .23 .66 .21
(5.6) (2.0) (5.7) (0.6)
AGE .15 —.44 .44 —.26
(6.1) (—5.6) (6.6) (—1.2)




p CEBIT)=ten-yeargrowthrateof earnings before interest andtaxes
aCEBIT)=ten-yearnormalized standard deviation of EBIT arounditsgrowth
trend
E/BA =ratioof earnings to non—pension assets
pCE/BA)=ten-yearmean of EISA
a CE/BA)=ten-yearstandard deviation of E/BA around p CE/BA)
u(T/E) =five-yearmean of ratio of taxes paid to before—tax earnings
p(L/S) =five—yearmean of ratio of labor and related expenses to net sales
AGE =ratioof pension plan participants currently employed to all
plan participants—15—
sense. Instead, the firm may take PL as given —bylabor market
considerations,for example —sothat its actual choice in this
context is simply how much of its pension liabilities to fund. If the




Moreover, if the firm decides only secondarily on its unfunded pension
liabilities (that is, on its pension assets in this context), then again
the possibility arises that (PL —PA)depends on BA and BL as well as on
anyorall of the other factors included within X.
The parallel question in this context is whether firmswithlarge
amounts of debt on their balance sheet choose to have greater or smaller
amounts of unfunded liabilities. In this form the question bears a direct
connection to at least one prominent line of theoretical analysis of how
corporations'pension funding decisions depend on their financial condition.
Inparticular, Sharpe (1976)has suggested that an important rationale for
firms tofund their pension plans less than fully is the value of the
insurance provided by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) •15
In Sharpe's analysis the insurance written by the PBGC is equivalent to
a put option, and the firm's incentive is to maximize the value at the put.
A major implication of this line of reasoning is that firmsforwhich the
probability of bankruptcy is nontrivial have an incentive to underfund their
pensionplans. The more highly levered a firm is, therefore —that is,the
largeris BL relative to NW, all other considerations equal —thegreater—16—
isthe firm's incentive to underfurid its pension plan. In terms of the
current analysis, therefore, the Sharpe hypothesis suggest that BL and
(PL—PA)are complements.
Theevidence from the1977 Form5500sampleisconsistent with
complementarity not onlyofBL andPt,as in (4), but also of BL and
(PL—PA).Hence the data are consistent with Sharpe's analysis of the
pension funding decision. Estimating the cross—section regression
PL-PA— EL
(7) NWa+y
for the full sample yields y =.14,with t—statistic 10.1
2=.07)
16
For the subsample of firms with PL/TA >.03,the corresponding results
are y =.25,with t—statistic 9.3 (R2 =.13).For the subsample with
Pt/TA >.10,the results are y =.44,with t—statistic 10.8 (R
2=.27).
Table 7 shows estimation results, comparable to those in Table 6,
for a parallel series of regressions
PL-PAC+y+X (8)
that differ only in the assnption that the firm's choice variable is
unfunded pension liabilities rather than total pension liabilities.
Here Sharpe's analysis implies that aspects of the firm's operating
environmentthat affect its probability of bankruptcy —variabilityof
earnings, for example —shouldalso increase thefirm's incentive to
underfund itspension.ice again, the strongpositiverelationship
between(unfunded) pension liabilities and the firm's other liabilities
holds up regardless of the controlling variable. The results for theTABLE 7
RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN UNFUNDED PENSION LIABILITIES AND OTHER LIABILITIES
Full Sample PL/TA ￿..10Subsample
Control Variable _____ ______ _____ ______
p(EBIT) .14 .13 .45 —.82
(9.6) (0.3) (10.2) (—0.4)
a(EBIT) .14 .17 .45 1.05
(9.7) (0.8) (10.8) (1.3)
E/BA .15 .35 .48 .88
(7.3) (2.7) (8.1) (2.1)
liCE/BA) .12 .12 .42 .25
(6.5) (0.7) (7.5) (0.4)
c(E/BA) .12 —.32 .41 .11
(7.0) (—1.1) (8.4) (0.1)
li(T/E) .11 .00 .39 .05
(7.2) (0.4) (8.2) (1.1)
l1(L/S) .16 .16 .53 .30
(7.4) (2.1) (8.0) (1.1)
AGE .12 —.31 .39 —.37
(7.1) (—6.0) (8.1) (—2.4)





SeeTable 6 for definitions of variable symbols.—17—
effectsof the individual controlling variables are again aboutas in
Table6. In particular, neither volatility of earningsnor volatility
ofrate of return exhibits the significant positive effect that would
beconsistent with Sharpe's hypothesis.
Finally,the form of both (7)and (8)assumes not only that the firm
takesitspension liabilities as given in deciding on pension funding, but
alsothat the firmtakesdecisions solely on the difference (PL —PA)
irrespectiveof either individual amount. In otherwords, (7)arid (8)
are equivalent, respectively, to
= (9) NW NW NW
and
PA PL EL =a+6+y—+x (10)
subjectto the constraint (S =1.The data consistently reject this con-
straint, however. Estimating (9) for the full sample yields (S =.60and
=—.06with respective t—statistics 42.8 and —4.9 (R2 =59)17For the
subsample with PL/TA >.03,the corresponding results are 6.63 and
y =-.09,with respective t-statistics 32.8 and —4.4 (2 =.66).For the
subsample with PL/TA >.10,the results are 6 =.66and y =-.16,with
respective t—statistics 22.6 and —4.7 (R2 =.64).The results of
estimating (10) withanyof the control variables shownin Tables 6 and7
indicate similar values for iS and y,andvalues that are again consistent
withthosefound inestimating (5) and (8).
Hence the fLrm-to-fjrm variation in pension funding does notsimply
reflect individual firms' decisions strictly about their unfunded liabilities.—18—
Atthe margin, withotherfactors equal, a firmwithan additional $1 of
pension liabilities typically funds onlyabout60 more in pension assets.
This marginal funding rate —marginalfrom one firm to thenext,that is,
rather thanforonefirm overtime —isalso just equal to the average
funding ratio (.62) for all firmsinthe sample. In addition, the
consistent finding of a negative y value in (9) and(10)indicates that
firmswithgreater amounts of non-pension liabilities fund their pension
liabilities less fully, tothe extent of about a l0 reduction in pension
funding for each $1 of additional non—pension liabilities. This result is
again consistent with Sharpe's analysis of the pension funding decision in
the context of the value of the put to the PBGC.
The main conclusions that emerge from this consideration of the
firm's choice of pension liabilities and funding, on the asstunption that
the asset and liability totals on the firm's balance sheet are predetermined
with respect to its pension decisions, are (1) that pension liabilities,
either in total or in excess of funding, depend positively on the firm's
other liabilities; (2) that firms do not make decisions simply with respect
to their unfunded pension liabilities, but instead fund pension liabilities
less than one-for-one at the margin; (3) that funding of the firm's pension
liabilities depends negatively on its other liabilities; and (4) that,
apart from labor—specific characteristics like the firm's labor intensiveness
and the working—retired status of its labor force, basic aspects of the
firm's risk and return position have no apparent effect on its choice of
either total or unfunded pension liabilities.—19—
III. The Earnings Smoothing Hypothesis
The discussion of pension funding strategy in Section II focuses
on fundamental aspects of portfolio behavior: substitutability versus
complementarity of pension arid other liabilities, the degree to which pension
assets offset pension liabilities, and the role of other measures of risk
and return confronting the firm. From the perspective of any familiar theory
of corporate financial behavior, these considerations and others like them
are the principal determinants of the firm's pension decisions.
By contrast, discussions of pension funding strategy by corporate
practitioners often emphasize different factors. In particular, in seeking
to explain why so many firms underfund their pension piansdespiteapparent
tax incentives to fund fully, corporate financial officers and other financial
market participants frequently cite the "hidden" nature of pension liabilities.
Because the pension plan is off the balance sheet, shareholders and others
may be at least partly unaware of the associated liabilities. The most
obvious implication of this assertion is that a firm may be able to raise
its share price by substituting pension liabilities for liabilities that
appear on the balance sheet, but recent research on the relationship between
stock prices and pension liabilities has provided evidence that typically
18
warrants rejecting this proposition.
A further implication of the idea that pension assets and liabilities
are "hidden" is that shareholders and other interested persons may judge
the firm's performance by its reported earnings, rather than by more com-
prehensive flow measures. Because contributions to a firm's pension plan
reduceits reported earnings in the same way as any other expense item,
control over the timing of pension contributions enables firms to influence
thetime path of reported earnings. Totheextent that the management seeks—20—
to report smoothly growing earnings over time, therefore, itmaywant to
increasepension contributions when business is strong and reduce them when
business is weak. Such actions need not change the total amount contributed
to the pension plan over time. Indeed, in the broader context that consol-
idates the firm's pension assets arid liabilities with its other assets and
liabilities, such actions change nothing at all. They have a purpose only
if some constituency, whose actions matter to the corporation, focuses on
the time path of reported earnings.
This earnings smoothing hypothesis provides a potential explanation
for the pension underfunding puzzle to the extent that firms with unfunded
pension liabilities have more flexibility to adjust the timing of their
pension contributions than do firms with fully funded pensions. Restrictions
on pre-funding unaccrued pension liabilities prevent a firm with a fully
funded pension from making extraordinary increases in contributions, and
firms that simply decide to fund fully choose thereby to forego using the
potential flexibility in the opposite direction.
Data from the 1977 Form 5500 sample provide evidence indicating
that firms typically do manage earnings in this way. For the entire sample
of firms with defined benefit plans, 70.0% had before—tax reportedearnings
streams that were smoother, as measured by the normalized ten—year standard
deviationaround trend, than the corresponding consolidated earnings including
pension contributions. On an after-tax basis, with the included pension
contributions adjusted for additional taxes that the firm would otherwise
have paid, 70.5% of firms had smoother reported earnings than consolidated
earnings -
Nevertheless,the data provide almost no support for the claim that
firms with underfunded pension liabilities are more likely to manage their—21—
reported earnings in this way. Table 8 shows the percentages of firmswith
smoother reported than consolidated earnings, comparable to the percentages
reported above, for a break-down of the full sample according to the ratio
of pension assets to pension liabilities. If anything, these distributions
seem to indicate that firms with underfunded pension liabilites are less
likely to engage in smoothing their reported earnings by managing their
pension contributions. Only for the two extreme subsamples —with funding
ratios below .10 or above .90 —doesthe relationship go in the hypothesized
direction.





whereaCE) and a(E +PC)are the normalized ten-year standard deviations of
reported earnings and consolidated earnings, respectively, yields a value
ofwhich is positive, as hypothesized, but negligibly small andwith
t—statisticless than 0.1. The results for the relationship based on
after—tax earnings are analogous.
In stan, the evidence does show substantial prevalence of the timing
of pension contributions so as to smooth reported earnings, but it does not
support the hypothesis relating this activity to the funding status of firms'
pensions. The explanation for the underfunding puzzle apparently lies
elsewhere.TABLE 8
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IV. Pension Asset Allocations
Private pension pians invest their assets in a way unlike any other
major category of institutional investors. For the aggregate of all pension
plans, nearly two—thirds of all assets held are corporate equities. Among
other major investor groups (apart from mutual funds), the corresponding
fractions are about one-fifth equities for the public pension plans sponsored
by state and local governments, one-sixth equities for fire and casualty
insurance companies, and one-ninth equities for life insurance companies
(even including some "separate accounts")
19
Clearly there is something
unique about the investment choices made by private pension plans.
To the extent that the assets in a corporation's defined benefit
pension plan "belong" to the sponsoring firm's shareholders, in the sense
that they and not the plan's beneficiaries stand to gain or lose according
to the assets' return, the heavy concentration of private pension assets in
equities is not surprising.0 By holding the corporation's shares in the
first place, shareholders have already expressed the desire for an equity
investment. Because of the pension plan(s) that the firm sponsors, however,
each such investment represents ownership in two pools of assets. If the
firm's pension plan holds debt securities instead of equities, then the
-shareholder's investment is no longer a pure (or even levered) equity but a
mixture of debt and equity claims.
In the simplest abstraction like that used to motivate the discussion
in Section II, a corporation would not hold its pension assets in any form
other than the ordinary assets of its business —that is, in its own stock.
Legal restrictions preclude holding pension assets entirely in this form,
however, and also impose "prudence" standards that many firms interpret
to preclude investing pension assets entirely in equity securities even on—23—
a fully diversified basis. Once again, therefore, the extreme simplifica-
tion doesnot adequately describe the behavior of actual corporations and
the pension plans that they sponsor. In addition, tax considerations appear
to favor holding equity assets outside the pension plan anddebtassets in
the plan.21
The discussion in Section II emphasizes the role of the firm's pension
assets and liabilities, along with the assets and liabilities on its balance
sheet,in determining its overall risk and return posture. The allocation
of the pension assets among alternative investmentvehicles is a further
element in this calculus. For example, borrowing in the credit market
to finance additional (tax-deduction augmented) pension contributions has
essentially no risk implications for the firm if the pension plan then
invests these funds in debt securities, but such an action increases the
firm's risk if the pension plan invests in equities.22
The dependence of the firm's riskand return posture on the allocation
of its pension assets raises in turn the possibility that these allocations
may depend on the firm's asset—liability structure in thesense ofeither
(1) or (2), or on other characteristics of the firm's business and
financial situation as introduced in (3), or on both. Sharpe's analysis
described in Section II, for example, suggests that firms with nontrivial
probability of bankruptcy have an incentive to maximize the value ofthe
effective put to the PBGC. In the context of pension asset allocation
decisions, therefore, the Sharpe hypothesis is that firms bearing
greater overall risk will tend to invest their pension assets morein
equities. Hence the more highly levered a firm is (as measured by
debt on the balance sheet or by unfunded pension liabilities), or the
greater is its risk exposure in other regards, the greater is thefirm's—24—
incentive to invest its pensionassetsin equities.
In the simple context of (3), the question of pension asset
allocation represents simply a disaggregation within the pension asset
total PA. By contrast, if the total amount of pension assets is predeter-
mined with respect to the allocation as seems plausible in the
context of most corporations' decision procedures —then PA is the





where the PA. are specific forms of pension assets, andand B are again as
in (3). Table 9 presents the results of estimating this relationship,
forthe sample of all Compus tat firms sponsoring defined benefit plans,
in the somewhat different form
PAE
1 PA PAD =a+y +x (13)
PAO
where PAE, PAD and PAO are pension assets in defined benefit plans,
held in equities, debt securities, and other investment vehicles,
respectively, cis a vector of coefficients swnxning to zero, and y
is a vector of coefficients summingtounity.
The one result that stands out in Table 9 is the negative relation-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variability of the firm's earnings relative to trend —a result that is
directly counter to the implication of Sharpe's hypothesis. Moreover,
this result holds regardless of the definition of earnings used (before
tax, after tax, with or without consolidation of pension contributions,
etc.), anditalso holds for subsaxnpleslimited accordingto the importance
23 of pensionassetsin the firm's overall asset structure. Hence firms
with greater business risk, as measured by greater volatility of earnings,
systematically seek to offset at least part of that risk by investing
their pension assets in instruments other than equities.
It is interesting that several measures included in Table 9
do not appear to affect pension asset allocations. Despite the incentives
for taxable firms to hold high—yield assets in their pension plans and
low—yield assets on their balance sheets, as emphasized by Black (1980)
and Tepper (1981), the firm's tax status over the past five years had
no apparent impact at this level. Similarly, although the age and
related structure of the pension plan's beneficiary population affects
the time profile of liabilities under the plan, the current employment
ratio also had no effect. Finally, the firm's overall pension funding
ratio had no noticeable effect either —againin apparent contradiction
of Sharpe's analysis.
It is also useful to note how two specific aspects of the results
shown in Table 9 carry over to the larger sample including Compustat firms'
defined contribution plans as well as their defined benefit plans. First,
the negative relationship between earnings volatility and the equity alloca-
tion was smaller in absolute magnitude, but statistically more significant,
in the broader sample.24 With cY(EBIT) as the control variable in (13), the—26—
estimated value ofin the equity equation was —.11, with t—statistic
-4.0 (R2=.60).Second,although the current employment ratio of the
beneficiarypopulationdid not matter in the defined-benefit—only saxle,
it did in the broader sample. With AGE as the control variable, the




Because a large AGE ratio typically reflects a younger
beneficiary population, a positivevalue meansthat plans with younger
workersare typically more heavily invested in equities. Hence pension
plans in which the beneficiaries stand to gain or lose according to the
return on the plan's invested assets do take account of the beneficiary
population's age structure in making asset allocation decisions, even though
plans in which the firm's shareholders stand to gain or lose from the
assets' return do not.
The pension asset allocation andthepension funding ratio are two
major determinants of prospective risk and return for manyfirms.A third
important element in the risk and return structure, of course, is the debt
on the firm's balance sheet. The relationship among these several components
raises the possibility, therefore, that the firm's allocation of its pension
assets may also depend on its basic leverage. A relationship consistent
with the risk—offsetting strategy reported above, for example, would be for
highly levered firms to offset some of their leverage by holding debt
securities in their defined benefit pension plans.27 Alternatively,
undereither Sharpe 's PBGC put hypothesis or some form of "general
aggressiveness" hypothesis, firms content to have a more leveraged
position,asindicated by the liabilities on their balance sheets,
might further extend that risk posture by investing their pension assets
in equities.—27—
Table10 presents the results of an attempt to examine this question






where BEQ is the book value of equity on the firm's balance sheet, andall
other variables are as before. The estimated value of y is consistently
positive, in contradiction to either the Sharpe hypothesis or a "general
aggressiveness" hypothesis, indicating instead that firms with more
highlylevered balance sheets have some tendency to offset that leverage
28 byinvesting more or their pension assets in debt secuzities. Somewhat
surprisingly, however, this positive relationship is statistically
significant (andlarger) in the broadersampleincludingdefined contribu-
tion plans but not in the sample limitedto defined benefit plans.
The estimated $valuesshown in Table 10 support and extend the
findings shown in Table 9inseveral ways. First, the allocationof pension
assetsto debt securities is positively related to anymeasure of the
variability of earnings. It isinteresting that this effect, too,isalways
largerand more highly significant in the broader sample. Second, firms
withhigh rates of return (to either assets or book equity) tend to invest
their pension assets more in equities and less in debt securities. Third,
the firm's tax statusapparentlyhas no independent impact on pension asset
allocation,although allowing for it about doublesthe estimated magnitude
of the effect of balance sheet leverage. Fourth, after allowance for balance
sheet leverage, firms with yowiger pension beneficiary populations tend to
invest more in debt securities and less in equities, although the estimated
effect is smaller (as would be expected) and statistically insignificantTABLE 10
RELATIONSHIPBETWEEN PENSIONASSET ALLOCATIONAND FIRM LEVERAGE
Defined Benefit Only All Pension Plans
Control Variable _____ ______ ______
P(EBIT) .05 —.23 .09 .07
(0.9) (—0.3) (1.9) (0.1)
o(EBIT) .05 1.3]. .09 1.86
(1.1) (3.6) (2.0) (5.7)
p(E/BA) .02 —.25 .02 —.55
(0.4) (—0.8) (0.4) (—1.9)
(E/BA) .05 1.77 .09 2.96
(1.1) (3.8) (2.0) (6.9)
1J(E/EQ) .04 —.08 .07 —.11
(0.7) (—2.1) (1.5) (—2.6)
a(E/EQ) .04 .03 .07 .04
(0.8) (1.9) 1.6) (2.3)
i(T/E) .10 .00 .17 .00
(2.0) (0.5) (3.8) (0.4)
AGE .05 .22 .08 .14
(1.0) (2.6) (1.9) (1.8)





E/EQ =ratioof earnings to book value of equity
(E/EQ) =ten-yearmean of E/EQ
c(E/EQ) =ten-yearstandard deviation ofE/EQ around 1.t(E/EQ)
SeeTable6 for definitions of other variable symbols.—28—
inthe broader sample including defined contribution plans.
The main conclusions of this analysis of the allocation of pension
assets, ontheassumption that not only the pension asset total but also
theother principal elements of the firm's asset and liability structure
are predetermined with respect to that allocation choice, are(1) thatfirms
withmore volatileearnings invest pension assets so as to offset their
ordinarybusiness risk by holding less equity andmore debt securities in
thepension; (2) that firms with more highly leveraged balance sheets invest
pensionassets soas to offsetthis risk too, again by holding less equity
and more debt securities in the pension; (3) that firms earning high rates
of return adopt the opposite allocation strategy, investing pension assets
more in equities and less in debt securities; and (4) that firms' pension
asset allocation decisions also depend on the current employment status
of the pension beneficiary population, with employed (hence presumably
younger) beneficiaries leading firms with defined benefit plans to invest
pension assets less in equity and more in debt securities, but with just
the opposite effect for defined contribution plans.—29—
V. The Corporate Balance Sheet
The empirical analysis undertaken in Sections II and IV considers
first the firm's pension funding strategy, and then its pension asset
allocation, on the assumption that theamountand nature of assets and
liabilities on the firm's balance sheet are predetermined with respect to
decisions about the firm's pension. Such a secondary role for pension
decisions in corporate financial structures may be plausible when the sums
involved are small in relation to the sponsoring firm's ordinary business
assets and liabilities. In an increasing number of corporations, however,
pension liabilities (and pension assets too, if the liabilities are fully
funded) are large in comparison to the assets and liabilities that appear
on the firm's balance sheet. Moreover, pensions are continuing to grow
more rapidly than general corporate assets or liabilities. The larger
pensions become, the more likely it is that firms make decisions about their
pension assets and liabilities and their other assets and liabilities
jointly.
As the discussion in Section II already emphasizes, the combination
of legal requirements and established labor market practices sharply restricts
many firms' flexibility with respect to their pension liabilities. In
considering possible interrelationships by which the firm's pension assets
and liabilities affect its ordinary business decisions, therefore, a useful
place to begin is the possibility that the direction of influence in (4)
and (5) is backward. Estimating the reverse relationship, in which the firm




yieldsy =.26,with t—statistic 7.8 (R2 =.04),for the sample of all
Conipustatfirms sponsoring defined benefit plans, and y=.34,with
t-statistic7.9(R2=.17)for the subsample in which each firm's pension
29 liabilities equal at least one—tenth of its total assets.
That estimating (4) in the reverse order (15) again leads to a
significant positive relationship is hardly surprising. What is more
interesting is that thepositive partial relationship between pension
liabilitiesand other liabilities —thatis, the relationship after
allowance for other controlling variables —alsoholds up on reversal
of the ordering. Table 11 presents results, analogous to those in
Table 6, of estimating the reverse of (5),
= (16)
for the full sample and the sample with PL/TA >.10.ice again, the strong
positive value of y appears regardless of the choice of controlling variables.
Although the focus of this paper is not on corporations' debt issuance,
except inits relation to their sponsored pension plans, it is interesting
nevertheless to notice several of thevalues in Table 11. First, the
growth of earnings had no effect on pension liabilities in (5), but earnings
growth negatively affects other liabilities in (16). This result also holds
for other definitions of earnings. Second, the mean rate of return either
onassets or on equity (not shown in the table) had no effect on pension
liabilities in (5), but mean returns negatively affect other liabilities
in (16). Third, the variability of the firm's rate of return affected
pension liabilities negatively in (5), but return variability affects other
liabilities positively in (16), at least in the full sample.3° Fourth,TABLE 11
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BALANCE SHEET LIABILITIES AND PENSION LIABILITIES
Full Sample PL/TA ￿.10Subsample
Control Vari1e _____
p(EBIT) .25 —5.62 .32 —8.45
(7.5) (—6.5) (7.6) (—4.0)
C(EBIT) .26 .40 .34 —.92
(7.5) (1.0) (7.9) (—1.0)
E/BA .22 —3.52 .28 —3.77
(6.9) (—20.6) (6.8) (—11.1)
p(E/BA) .20 —4.].]. .27 —4.66
(5.6) (—15.5) (6.0) (—8.6)
o(E/BA) .24 1.20 .34 1.54
(6.1) (2.3) (6.8) (1.1)
.24 .00 .33 —.02
(6.5) (0.1) (6.9) (—0.5)
p(L/s) .28 —.33 .30 —.63
(5.6) (—2.4) (5.7) (—2.5)
AGE .24 .12 .33 —.28
(6.1) (1.2) (6.6) (—1.5)
Notes: Results shown are estimated coefficients (and t—statistics) for the
regression
BL PL =
SeeTable 6 for definitions of variable symbols.—31—
labor intensity affected pension liabilities positively in (5), at least
in the full sample, but labor intensity affects other liabilities
negatively in (16). Each of these influences is familiar in the literature
oncorporate choice of capital structures, and these results would perhaps
be of interest in an investigation of that subject. In the context of this
paper's focus on pensions, the main point is simply that the positive
partial relationship between pension liabilities andother liabilities
holdsupafter allowance for any ofthese separate effects.
Similarconclusions follow fran reversing the order of (7) and (8),
which treat not total pension liabilities but only the unfunded portion
as the relevant measure. Estimating the reverse relationship
EL PL-PA = (17)
yields y =.50with t—statistic 10.1
2=.07),for the full sample and
y =.61,with t-statistic 10.8 (R
2=.27)for the PL/TA >.10subsample.31
Controlling for additional influences by estimating the regression
BL PL-PA =cz+y (1.8)
also yields consistently positive y values, and values roughly in line
with those shown in Table 11 and discussed above.
Cmce again, it is useful to examine whether pension liabilities and
assetsmatter separately in this context, or whether what matters is only
the difference, as in (17) and(18).Estimating the regression
BL PL PA = (19)—32—
forthe full sample yields y =.49and(5=—.51with respective t-statistics
4.8 and —2.7 ('2 =.05).For the PL/TA >.10sample, the corresponding
results are y =.58and 6 =—.54,with respective t—statistics 6.1 and —3.1
(R2 =.17).To the extent that firms make borrowing decisions in light
of their pension assets and liabilities, therefore, what matters is just
the unfunded pension liabilities.32 Moreover, these results too hold up
in the presence of other controlling variables like those included in Table
10.
Finally, if firmsdecideon their pension assets arid liabilities
and on their other assets and liabilities in a fully joint way, then neither
the direction of influence assumed in the regressions presented in Section II
nor that assumed in (15) —(19)is strictly correct. Instead, a fully
simultaneous portfolio choice like that in (3) —or, if only unfunded
pension liabilities matter, (6) —would be the correct way to view the
firm's decision process. Table 12 presents results (values of ) for
estimating (3) directly, using one independent variable at a time. These
results add little to the analysis above, however. With thesomewhat
marginalexception of the earnings volatility measure, the estimation of the
full portfolio choice model does not reveal influences that affect both the
pension andthebalance sheet.33
The main conclusions of this analysis of the relationship between the
firm's borrowing decisions anditspension assets andliabilitiesare (1)
thatthe amount of liabilities on the firm's balance sheet is positively
related to the firm's pension liabilities; and(2) thatwhat matters for
the determination of balance sheet liabilities in this context is just the
firm'sunfundedpensionliabilities rather than its pension assets and
liabilitiesseparately.TABLE 12
FULL PORTFOLIO TREATMENT OF THE PENSION AND BALANCE SHEET
BL BA PL PA
Control Variable NW NW NW NW
p(EBIT) —7.32 —8.26 —1.15 —.21
(—5.5) (—5.2) (—1.0) (—0.3)
a(EBIT) .91 1.63 1.45 .72
(1.6) (2.5) (2.9) (2.7)
ElBA —4.10 —4.42 —0.23 0.08
(—16.8) (—14.0) (—0.8) (0.5)
p(E/BA) —4.94 —5.42 —.62 —.14
(—12.7) (—11.1) (—1.5) (—0.6)
a(E/BA) 2.2]. —2.16 —.46 —.41
(2.8) (—2.2) (—0.6) (—1.0)
—.01 —.01 —.00 —.00
(—0.5) (—0.4) (—0.1) (—0.2)
p(L/s) —.08 .22 .74 .45
(—0.4) (1.0) (4.7) (5.1)
AGE .13 —.28 —.68 —.28
(0.9) (—1.6) (—5.2) (—3.8)







See Table 6 for definitions of variable symbols.—33—
VI.Concluding Remarks
The final paragraph in each of Sections II -Vsummarizes in capsule
form the principal specific empirical findings of this paper, arid there is
no need to restate each one here. The unifying overall conclusion from
the data is that U.S. corporations do not manage the pension plans which
they sponsor as if these plans had nothing to do with the corporation.
Different responses appear to characterize firms' behavior in different
contexts, but the evidence persistently indicates clear relationships
between decisions about pension assets and liabilities arid decisions about
the other assets and liabilities of the firm. At the same time, the pattern
of these relationships is, more often than not, inconsistent with familiar
hypotheses that have emerged thus far in the theoretical literature
analyzingpension aspects of corporate finance.
At least three caveats are important, however. The most significant
isthat the measurement of pension liabilities is hardly uniform across
firms. To the extent that each corporation's management believes that
the value it reports for liabilities on Form 5500 Schedule B is the best
available measure of the firm's actual commitment or exposure, firm—to—
firm variation in actuarial assumptions need not affect the analysis here.
If managements make allowance for the differing actuarial assumptions,
however, then this analysis neglects a potentially important element.34
Further potential problems of a related nature also arise in connection with
the date and the method chosen for Schedule B valuation of pension assets.
The second major caveat stems from the use in this paper of fully
consolidated firm data, incorporating all wholly owned subsidiaries, whenever
possible. No doubt many parent corporations do adopt a consolidated approach
to financial management. Even so, the possibility remains that many-.34 —
firmshandle such matters as pension decisions in a decentralized way,
or that some of the parent-subsidiary relationships consolidated here were
then (and may still be) too recent to have had much impact on the structure
of the subsidiaries' pension assets and liabilities.
The third reason for caution in interpreting the results presented
here is simply that they reflect evidence from a cross—section of firms
(a quite comprehensive cross-section, to be sure) in one year only. Despite
its portfolio-theoretic approach, therefore, the analysis entirely omits
any account of effects due to changing yield relationships over time.
For the same reason, the analysis is also subject to all of the usual
problems associated with observing only one point in time. Was 1977 a
"typical" year, in any or all of the many senses that matter here? It is
never possible to answer such a question adequately. At the least, however,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation were both very recent as of 1977, and neither may
yet have had its full impact on corporations' behavior.
Each of these three reservations about the analysis presented in this
paper points to potentially fruitful directions for further empirical research.
Taking account of cross-firm variation in pension actuarial decisions, more
carefully treating the range of possible parent—subsidiary relationships,
and working with additional data as it becomes available would all be major
extensions of this work which could importantly alter the conclusions reached.
No doubt additional lines of investigation would provide new insights also.
This paper only begins to analyze the interrelationships connecting private
pensions and corporate finance. As private pensions continue to grow, in
both absolute and relative terms, those interrelationships will almost
surelybecomemore powerful and more important for understanding financial
behavior.APPENDIX
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(4)hi Vs adefined benefit plan nn.evedwider thePsniianBenefit Guaranty Corporation
tSflPINilbOfl insurance program? No 0 Not determined
7 Numb., of participants as of th. md of the plan year (welfarm p4an complete only (s)(e,), (b), (C) aid (4)):
(a) Mtive p,i'icpants (employed or carried as active) (I) Number fully vested . • L
(N) Number partially vested -I (HI) N*or nonvsstsd... I
(le)To
) Retired or separated participants receiving benefits . . . ____________________
4g)Retredorseparatodpa,ticjpanbentUedofutwob,,.rits __________
(4).-4swnof(a).(b)and(c) ____________
4.) D.csss.d participants whose beneflcaries are receiving or are entitled to receive bsnabts
0) Tl.(d)pk.s(.) ••• • _________
No
Ø DurIng the plan year. was any p. ipalit(s) separated from service with S deferred vested baeifl. .
H ves, see Instructions. ____
C Plan amendment Information (welfars plans complete onty (a). (b)) aid (C)):
(a)Wasariy.mendm.nttothisplan.eptedinthjsplanyearf
4 If 'Yes" (1) And if a materialmOdifICatiOn,has a summaiy description of this modification—
(A) Sean sent to plan participants?
(I) S..nhlsdwitl.DOL?
(B) Den y irk -toset iwalt I Re ,ed.cti.s .4 the amued b.at .4 y psiticiped ir the pies?.
(HI) Witi sinendmeet reault In a reduction of current or Mute benefits?
(Iv) Has a determination letter been requested from IRS with respect to such amsndnienti.
(C) Enter the dat. the most recent amendment was adocted. . Iv' Month Div Year
• Plan tarawiuation information (welfar, plans complete onty (a), (u),(c)and C?)):
(s)Wasthsplanterminat.t'duflngthasplanyez.-oranypnorplanyeafl
(is) If Yes,' were all trust assets distributed to participants or beneficiaries or transferred to another plan? . .
(c) Was a resolution to terminate this plan adopted during this porn year or any prior plan year?
(d) If (a) or (c) is Yes.' ban yeu rscched a fatorabi. determisatior, letter from ItS with reaped to serk teesisaflou?
(e) If (d) is 'ifo." has a detvmination letter been requested from IRS?
(1) If (a) er (c) is 'Yrr," lays participants and benefici.fles lam rotifsed of the tennisatice or the proposed tormiuatice?. . . .
20 (a) I.tpLan year. was the plan mergedosssolidatsd Ito leCthSI phi wire lesits or habilitiss (ransfenid to another pbe?._______
If Yes," identify other plan(s): (C) Employer identification number(s)(4) Plan number(s) ___ -- ______ ______
(s) f4as Form 5310 been filed with IRS' Yes pie
31 Indicate funding arrangement
() o Trust (bensfits provided In whole from trust funds) - ) o or arrangement providing benefits partially through Insurance and/or annuity contracts
(0 0 Trust or arrangement providing benefits .sdusively through Insurance and/or annuity contracts
(4) dial account described in section 401(1) of the Code and not incleded in (C) above
(0 Q Other (specify) _______ ______
(1) If (b) or (c) Is checked, enter the number of Schedule A's (Form 5500) WhiCh are atteched 4.
*2 Did 101 p.os wIt rendered seficas to the $aa recites. directly or isdiredly, osmpseeatios ties Re pb. ispIes pent. . Q Yes0No

















(14)Itt bsnk (A) Certicates of deposit.
(B) Other Interest beanng
(C) Non.ntersst bearing
(lii) Total cash
0) Receivab4es (.) Employer eninbutions
(Il)Employee contributions
(Mi) Other
(iv) Reserve for dovbtful accounts
(v)Net receivables, sum of (I), (II) and (ai) minus (lv).
4e)Generalinvest,nents other than p.rty-lnintsrast investminta
(I)U.S.Governments.cuitbes )Longtenn. (B)Shortterm.
(14)Stat. and municipal securities
(ill) Corporate debt snstrumenft (A)Longt.rm.
(W) Corporate etocks (A) Preferred
(B) Common




(ix)Value*1 interest in pooledtund(i).
(a) Otherinvestments
(xl) Total general investments,sumof (I) through
(d) Pasty-in-interestinvestments
(1)Corporate debt instruments




(v) Loans ottier than mortgages
(vi) Other Investments
fri)Totalparty•in•interest investments, sum of (I) through(vi).
(a) Buildings and other depreciable property
(I) Value of unallocated insurance contracts:
(a)Separate accounts .
(ii)Other
(144) Total. (I) plus (ii)
(g) Other assets
(Pt) Total assets, siam of (a)(iiP), (b)(v), (c)(xi), (d)(vii). fe). (f)(Iii) and (g)
Usbes
(I) Pay.bies (I) Plan claims
(14)Other payables
(lii) Total payables. (I) plus (Ii)
(3) Acquisitionindebtedness
(Pt) Other liabilities
(1) Total liabilities., sum of (I)(iii), (J) and (Pt)
(art) Net assets. (Pt) less (I)
-A3-
5500 (1577)
*3 Plan assets and liabilities at the beginning snd the end of the plan year (list afl assets and liabilities at current value). if plank
Pagnded entirety by allocated insurance contracts for which no trust Is involved, check boa and do not complete this It.m. .
Noto Include aftplanassets and Siabthffes of a trust or uparafey maintained fund. (II more than one trust/fund, report on a
combined basis.) Includ, unallocated, butnotallocated, insurance contracts. Round off amounts to nearest jolla,.
p 3
(a)




(at) During the plan year what were the:
(I) Total cost of acquisitions for common stock?
(ii) Total proceeds from dispositions of common stock?-A4 -
P.m ssoc ns7li pIt, 4
14 Plan income, expenses and changes In net assets for the plan ysan
N Includeall incomeandexpanses ofa trust(s) or separately mainta
(a)Contrlbuticnsreceived or receivable Incashfrom—
(I) Employer(s) (including contributions on behalf of s.tf-employed Individuals)
(U) Employees
(MOOthers
0) Neucash cautioes (p.cify satws and by alum sad') .
(a) Total contAbutloi,s, sum of (a) and (b)





(e) Net realized gain (lou) on sale or exchange of assets—
(1)Aggiat.proceeds
(19Aggrat.costs
(f) Other •(specdy) .__________ __________
(g) Total Income, sum of (c) through (I)
Q) Dietribuhon of benefits and payments to provide benefits—
(1) Dlr.ctfy to parlicipants or their beneficiaries
(19 To insurance carrier or s4mitar organization for provision of benefits




(II) Fees and commissions
(AU) Insurance premiums for Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(iv) lnsurane premiums for fiduciary insi-anc* other than bonding.
(v)Otheradministrative expenses
(k) Other pet (specity)____ _______________
(I) Total expenses, sum of (h) through (k3
(ni)Netincome (expenses), (g) minus (I) _________________
(n) Chang. in net assets— _______________ ________________
(a) Unrealized appreciation (depreciation) of assets - -- - -
(U) Other changes (speafy) __________ ____
(o) Net increase (decrease) in net assets for the year. (m) plus (n)
(p) Net assets at beginning of year. line 13(m), column a
(q) Net assets at end of year, (o) plus (p) (equals line 13(m), column b)
• AmOunt I. Total
15 Has there been any change since the last report in the appointment of any trustee, accountant, insurance carrier...!5!... ...!!....
enrolled actuary, administrator, investment manager or custodian? ___________




(a) Was ieplan insuredby a fIdelity bond against losses through fraud or dishonesty?
(b) If "Yes," enterthemaximum amount of loss recoverable
(C) Enter th name of the surety company
(d) Does the plan, or a known party-ln4ntsrest with respect to the plan, haveany controlor significant fInancial
interest. direct or indirect, in th. surety company or Its agents or brokers?
(.) If the plan is not insured by • fidelity bond, explain why not .-—
(1)Inthe current plan year was any loss to the plan Caused by the fraudordishonesty of any plan official or em-
ployee of the plan or of other person handling funds of the plan?
If"Yes," see specific instructions.
17 Information about employees of employer at end of the planyear(Plans not purporting to satisfy the
percentage tests of sction 410(b)(1)(A) of the Code complete only (a) below and see spciflc instructions):
(a) Totalnumbei-of employees ____________
(b)Number of employees excluded under the plan—
(I) MinknumageorysarsofaeMce ___________
(U)Employees on whose behatf retirement benefits vets th. subject of collective bargaining _______________
(Th)Nonresident aliens who receivs no ied income from United States sources ____________
(lv)Total eaduded. sum of (I), (ii) and (iii) __________________
(C)Total number of employees not excluded. (a) less (b)(iv) _______________
(d)Employees Ineligible (specify reason)
(e) Employees eligible to participata, (c) less (d) . _______________
(f)Employees eligible but not participating ______________
(g)Employees participating, (e) less (f) • -.
3* Is this plan an adoption of a:
(a) 0/pretotyp(a) o" (c)0PaUarnor(d) 0Modelplan?. .•
If"Yes" enter thefouror eight digit IRSserialnumber (see instructions)
.!!_-2...
lB (a) Is it intended that this plan quality under section 401(a)or405 of the Code?
(b)Haveyou requested or received a determination letterfromthe IRSforthis plan?
If plan is integrated, check appropriate box:
(a)0 Socialsecurity (b) oRailroadretirement (c) o°i
21 (a) Is thi.s a defined benefit plan subject to ti's minimum funding standards for this plan year?
If "Yes." attach Schedule B (Form 5500).
(b) Pa this a defined contribution plan, I.e., money purchase or target benefit, subject to th. minimum fundingi
standerds? (If a waiver was granted, see insuctions.) — —
ft'Yes."complete (1), (ii) arid(lii)below
(I) Amount ofemployercontribution required for the plan year under section 412 of the Code ______________
(ii)Amount of contribution paid by thg employer for the plan year
Enter date of last payment by employer'Month Dey — Year..
(ui) Fundingdeficiency, excess, if any, of (i) over (ii)
The following questions relate to the plan jear. If (a)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or Cv) is checked "Yes," schedules of such
items in th. format set forth in the instructions are required to be attached to this form.
(a) (i) Did the plan have assetS held for investment?
(ii) Did any non-exempt transaction involving plan assets involve a party known to be a party'in-interest?.
(Iii) Were any loans by the plan or fixed income obligations due the plan Indefaultasofthe clos, of the plan
year or classified during the year as uncollectable?
(iv) Were any leases to which the plan was a party In default or classified during the year as uncoliectable?.
(v)Werear, plan transactions or series of transactions in excess of 3% of the current value of plan assets?.






23Complet, thisitemonly If you answered Yes, to Item 6(d) Ym No
Old one or more of therepoitabl.eventsor otherevents requiring notice to th Pension Snoflt Guaranty Corpora.
banour duflng thisplanyear'.
If Yss,' complete (a) through (h) below..
(a) Notification by the lnternilRevenueServic, that to. plan has ceased to be a plan as described In Section
4021(a)(2)of(RISAoradetermination by theSecretaryofLaborof noncompliance with11th I of £RI5A.. — —
(b) A decrease in ctive pav1icpants to the extent specifiedinthe instructions
(C)A detervnisiationby the InternalRevenue Service that there hasbeen a tennnation or paitAaltermination of the
planvAthin the meaning of Section 4114d)(3) of thi Cod. —
Cd) M Inability to bsn.flte when due —
(•)Adistribution toa Substantial Ownet to V* extent specifiedInthe Instructions
(I)M alternative method of compliance his been pcescrib.d for this plan by the Secretary of Labor wider Section
11OofERISA —
CL) A cessation of operations at a focility to to. extant specified In the inuctions
(Si) A withdrawal of a tubstantial enipioyor
ft additional specs isroquimdfor anyitem, attachad.itionai sheets the same asthisform.
* at — — P-owsSaw,....6
Actuarial Information jJ77 This schedule is required to be filed under section 104 of the EmpIoee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. referred to as ERISA, and sec- This Form is
lion 6059(a) of the internal Revenue Code, referred to as the Code. Open to Public
Attach to Forms 5500, 5500—C and 5500—K If applicable. Inspection
For plan year beginning • 1977 end ending • 19
Please complete every applicable item on this form. If an item does not apply, enter N/A."
Round off amounts to nearest dollar.
Name of plan sponsor as shown on line 1(a) of Form 5500. 5500—C or 5500-K Employer identification number
Name of plan Inter thee
digit plan
number .
Has a waiver of a funding deficiency for the current plan year been approved by the IRS'
If "Yes," attach a copy of the IRS approval letter.
Is a waived funding deficiency of a prior plan year being amortized in the current year' ..._ —
Have any of the periods of amortizatioT for ehatges described in section 412(b)(2)(B) of the Code been enlended by DOt.'
If "Yes," attach a copy of the DOL approval of extension letter.
(a) Has the shortfall funding method been used' — —
(b) (i) If (a) is 'Yes." has the deferral of the amortization of the shortfall gain (loss), beyond the plan year follow-
ing the year in which the shortfall gain (loss) arose, been electvd' —
(1.) 11(a) is "Yes," has the deferral of the amortization of the actuarial gain (loss), beyond the first plan year
after valuation, been elected' ____________
Actuarial method and operational information: (a) Enter most recent actuarial valuation date
(I') Enter date(s) and amount of contributions received this plan year for prior plan years and not previously reported:
Date(s) , Amount _______________
(c) Accumulated funding deficiency at end of plan year (amount of contribution certified by the actuary as -. ,,
necessary to reduce the funding deficiency to zero), from 7(m) or 8(g)
Cd) (I) Accrued liabilities as of (enter date) _________________
(i,) Value of assets as determined for fundirg standard account _________________
(iii) Unfunded accrued liability __________________
Ce) Value of vested benefits (if calculated) __________________
(f) Current value of the assets accumulated in the plan as of (enter date)
(g) Number of persons covered (included in the most recent actuarial valuation): (1) Active participants.
(ii) Terminated participants with vested benefits __________________
(iii) Retired participants and beneficiaries of deceased participants _________________
(h) (I) Actuarial gains or (losses) for period ending ' _________________
(ii) Shortfall gains or (losses) for period ending — _____________
(i) Attach a statement 0f actuarial assumptions and methods used to determine (i) the normal cost and
liabilities shown on lines 7(b) or 8(b) and 5(d) i) and (ii) the value of assets shovn on I ne 5d)(ii) The
statement is to include a summary of the principal eligibility and beiefit provisions upon which the valua-
lion was based, an identification of benefits not included in the calculation, and ether facts, si.nh as, any:.
change in actuarial assumptions or cost methods and justifications for any such change, Include also Such .
other information, if any, needed to fully and fairly disclose the actuai?t position of the plan.
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Statement vy enrolled actuary (see i:rstructiuns before signing):
To re hst of i—y tnoaIr,:e,is I orrirna sunI:ed in thio seue i eu the s:cvn,oanhirugEietrit.it any. iv tennis:. and o'erate. and iii ory conic!' I?,. .&no—n one
.sd in the agreain 13) are h090nabl, ,ea:ed La nit eepe:ience Ct the pun md ia rrasonatu eapc;:a:,.e, and (5) pferr.l n.y beat e$trnaie ciInhitipeted eupeituuco r.4it
the piauu.
Sgnatur. of aetu.ry Oat.
pent OF 1)00 pam. of actuary CnrO!mer.t numberSchedule 8 (Form 5500) 1977 p1 2
7 Funding standard account statement for plan year ending . .' -''-
Charges to funding standard account:
(a) Prior year funding deficie -cy. if any ________________
(b) Employer's normal cost for plan year ________________
Cc) Amortization charges (outstanding balance at beginning of plan year$ ) ________________
(d) Interest on (a), (b) and (c) _________________
(e) Total charge, sum of (a) through (d) .. ..
Credits to funding standard account:
(f) Prior year credit balance, if any _______________
(g) (r) Employer contributions (total from column (b) of item 6) ________________
(ii) Employer contributions received this plan year for prior plan years and not previously reported ________________
(h) Amortization credits (outstanjing balance at beginning of plan year . $ ),
(i) Interest on (f), (g) and (h) _________________
(j) Other (specify) _______________
(k) Total credits, sum of (f) through (j)
Ba lance:
(I) Credit balance, excess, if any, of (k) over (e)
(m) Funding deficiency, excess, if any, df (e) over (k)
8 Alternative minimum funding standard account (omit if not used):
(a) Was the entry age normal cost method used to determine entries in item 7 above' Yes o o
If "No," omit (b) through (g) below.
(b) Normal cost
(c) Excess, if any, of value of accrued be"iefits over market value of assets
(d) Interest on (b) and (C)
(e) Employer contributions (total from column (b) of item 6)
(0 Interest on (e)
(g) F'u'ding deficiency, excess, if any, of the sum of (b) throur,h (ii) over the sum of (e) and (I)
Instructions
Who Must Ful.—The employer or pla. ad.
ministrator of a defined benet,t plan that is
subject to the minimum funding standards (see
section 412 ci the Code and Part 3 of Title I
of CRISA) must tie this schedule as an attach.
tlient to tile annual return/report tiled for plan
years beginning on or alter January 1. 1976.
Plans maintained on January 1. 1974. pursuant
to one or more collective barganing agreements
entered into before ceptember 2. 1974. are not
subject to the minimum funding standards for
plan yea's beginning before the earlier of the
termination of the collective bargaining agree.
ment(s) or January 1, 1981.
For splitfurided plans, the costs and contribu.
tiont reported on Schedule B houid include
those iuiacl"g to 5oth trust funds and tnsurance
carriers.
Specific Instructions
(References are to line items on the form.)
4(a) A collectively barpained plan only may
elect th- shorifall fundng method (see regula.
tioris under section 412 of the Code). Advance
approval- from tfr IRS of the electiOn of tire
shortfall mel, 'sd of funding '5 O1 required lilt
is first adOpted on or before the later of (i) the
first plant year to which Section 412 of lila Code
applies or (ii) Vie last plan year commencing
before Fecember 31, 1983. Nowever, ad-dance
ap oval 1-om IRS is required, if adopted at a
later time i,,r if discontinued.
4(b) ft.'. arie approval from IRS of the ekc
tiOni Icr OdOr the aiirortzalori 01 the shcrlfall
Faii (;r.s) and,. or the amo"Irzaton cit the ac
twan (iOsst is required for a plan year, Su•
Seq. - : to Vie first plan year to liiCh tr'e short.
fall r,.einod appties. Advance approval from IRS
is reqred for discontinuanue.
5(a) The valuation for a plan year may be as
of any date in the year, inciud.r.., the fist and
last. Valuations rrrust be perfo'rncii wlhifl the
period sre'citied by sect'on 103(i) of tiSA end
Section (iv59(a) of the Code.
5(b) , :1 a2l,:sh:e to t"e fst rtan year to
?irC niinimum furrdiri standards appiy.
5(c) Insert amount from item 7(m), How.
ever, if the attern?tive method is elected, and
item 8(g) is smaller than item 7(n). enter the
amount from item 8(r), File Form 5330 with the
Internal Revenue Service to psy the 5(. excise
tax on the funding aeticiency.
5(d) Amounts in 5(d) Should alt be as of the
same dde which Should be the date nf (lie end
of the plan year or date as of whch tile most
recent actuarial ,'aluation was made, if amounts
are nd as of the date of the most recent actu.
anal valuation, indicate in the Statement of
actuarial assumpt.OnS and methods (as required
by 5(i)) how the amounts in 5(d) were deter.
mined. Liabilites fully funded by annuity and
insurance Contracts Other than any contract
funds not allocated to individuals may be
omitted from both items 5(d)(i) and 5(d)(ii).
5d)(i) lithe aggregate Cost or frozen iflitixl
liability method is used, enter "N/A."
5(d)(ii) Detc.r"r,ine the value of assrts in ac•
Cordance with Section 412(c)(2) of the Code or
307(c)(2) of ERiSA.
5(o(i') If the aggiegate Cost or frozen initial
liability niethiod is used, enter "N/A.''
5(1) Ths should be as enf the same date as
5(d) or, if not, the method of adjustment be.
tweefl the two dates Should be indicated in 5(i).
5(ti)(i) if the agiegee cost or frozen initial
Iiabiiity rr.ethod is used, enter "N/A
5(hflii) For the methods to be used to de'er.
mine the shortfall ga.n (loss) see tire reg,iaticrns
under section 422 of the Code.
5(i) A scininlary of one page or less cf gan
provisions will orina'iry by atruate. Fcn Vie
Inst year for which Schedule B is r'c.'ired to
be filed, no cilar.çe in the actuarial mel''od or
as,.urnptio"s needs to the noted cr ,ust',e,
In subseQuent years, a clrar..eri ar'tua'rat
method or pen year requires 11(5 aOroval.
Aeturial methods Should tie c'eS:rbei in ac
Cordance wtli Secton (31) of t11lSA as accrued
benefit cost (or Unit Credit), entry s.e flornial
Cost, irdiv,dviet ledel premium, a::'ej,ate cost,
attaned c;e nrnijt Cost or fro.r'n inteyl la.
bury. whe'e those terms are anp'.c,i,iie. If the
shortfall method of fnding is used, all pertinent
facts reltn' to furidni' peculiar to thIS method
Should be inci...000 in tr:y sattmcn:.
6 Show alt employer and employee Contnibu.
lions for tire plan year. and employer contrib'
lions made not later than 21/, r,ionithS (or Such
later date allowed under Suction 412(cl(1O) of
the Code and section 307(c)(10) of ER1SA) after
the end of the plan year.
Statement by enrolled aCtuary—In lieu of
signing the Staler-rent, an enrolled actuary ray
attach a signed statement containing the name,
acidness, enrollment number. telephone number
and the actuary's opin.on that the aSsu"nptions
used ii preparing Schedule B are in the aggre.
gate reasonably related to the expeitence of the
plan and to reasonable expectations, and repre.
Sent his or her best eSlirnrate of anticipated cx.
penierice under the plan end to the best of his
or her knowled1e the report is coml.lete and ac
Curate. In addition, the actuary may offer any
other comments related to the inforniatiort COO'
tamed in Schedule B.
7 Under the shortfall method of funding, tie
Normal Cost in tire funding Standard account, Is
the charge per unit of production (or per unit of
Service) nrutiplied by the actual nurner of unitS
of producticn (or writs "f Service) whch occurred
during tire piari year. Loch amortization install.
mont in the funding sta"dard account is Similarly
calculated. For a pieni maintained by more than
one employer, the amOrtization Of the shortfall
gain (loss) and tire actuarial ga.rt (lcsS) may be
deterred. See regulations under sect.ont 412 of
the Code.
7(b) II no vtuation was made for-the cur.
rent year. e"cer the r,cnr'ial cost ca:ula:ed in the
most rc:ei,t actuarial valuation, or the estimated
CcSt icr tIre current year based on so:ir valua.
ton. f amounts are rot as of tPe elate ci the
mOst rerermS a:t,rxniat va'at3n. indicate in the
statr'ment Of actuarial assunlrt'O'rS a—a metn.
005 (as required I'y (.)) hOw (tie amour.tS ShOWn
were Ctcrmner1.
8(a) If the entry age normal cost methcd was
not used to determine trre cntrres in item 7, the
atternatve minmum furring standaro account
may not be used.
-
8(c) The value cf eccrued bene'its ShOuld cx'
Cluds benefte accrued fr inc current ran year.
The market value of ets ShOuld C reduced
try the amount of any &itributionS for the cur.
ccitt p.ii yier.
-Foothotes
* Thispaperis a part of the National Bureau of Economic Research study
of private pension funds. I am grateful to Arturo Estrella and Joyce
Manchester for research assistance; to them, Jay Light, and the
participants in the National Bureau pension project, including especially
Fischer Black, for manyhelpfuldiscu.ssions and for comatents on an
earlierdraft; andto the National Bureau and the Alfred P. Sloan Founda-
tionforresearch support.
1. The 1977 "plan year" for purposes of Form 5500 is either the 1977
calendar year or the plan's fiscal year beginning in 1977. The plan
sponsor has until seven months after the plan year ends to file the
return.
2. A one—by-one inspection of the 384 plans reporting over $100 million
in assets suggested few obvious omissions among large corporate
sponsors.
3. By contrast, the Federal ReserveSystem's flow—of—fundsaccounts
reportedtotal assets of private pension funds as $178 billion at
yearend 1977 and$198billion at yearend 1978. The Form 5500 data
thereforeconfirm the widely acknowledged under-reporting inthe
flow-of-funds sample.
4. The largest single plan, sponsored by General Electric Co., reported
assets of $3.8 billion.
5. The great majority of companies sponsor five or fewer plans. The
largest number of plans sponsored by anyonecompany (excluding
subsidiaries) was63.6. The computer program that searches for Compustat matches was developed
by Clint Cuxmnins; I am grateful to him for making the program available
7. The key to this part of the matching process was the Directory of
CorporateAffiliations 1978 (Skokie: National Register Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1978).It would be difficult to overestimate the amountofpains-
taking effortdevoted to this task by Arturo Estrella and Joyce
Manchester.
8.Of the 1,836 consolidated plansponsors,1,571 sponsored defined
benefit plans.
9. The pension sponsor with the largest amountofpension assets on a
consolidated basis was American Telephone andTelegraphCo., with
$18.4 billion in assets held in 3 plans sponsored by the parent
companyand 26plans sponsored by subsidiaries.
10. See, for example, the work of Black (1980), Feldstein andSeligman
(1981), Qldfjeld (1977), Scholes (1981), Sharpe (1976) andTepper
(1981).
11. In many situations, a corporation's principal meansofflexibility in
this regard is its ability to choose what assumptions (interest rate,
inflation rate, etc.) to use in calculating the actuarial value of the
liabilities to be funded. See, for example, Pepper and Affleck (1974).
A careful empirical study of corporations' behavior in this regard
represents a potentially fruitful line of research, but one that lies
beyond the scope of this paper; see Section VI below.
12. U.S. corporations must report, as a foothote to the balance sheet,
the difference between vested pension liabilities andthelevel of
pensionfunding.Neither total need bestatedindividually, norneed
thecorporation report its non—vested liabilities at all (except onForm 5500Schedule B).
13. atever off—balance—sheet assets andliabilitiesthe firmhas,apart
from PA and FL,are includedin BA andBLfor purposes of this paper.
Seealsofootnote 34 below on the definition of PL.
14. The sample for this regression, andthosereported in the following
discussion,omits 13 firms for which net worth is sufficiently small
PL FL
that either or exceeds 3.0. The result of a significant
positive relationship also appears (although with smaller y values)
whenVL, thefirm's vested pension liabilities only, is used in
placeof total pension liabilities FL. (The simple correlation
betweenVL and FL withinthe total sample is .89.) It is interesting
tonote that regressions of the form (4) and also (5) below, estimated
with BA instead of NW as the scale variable, typically show a small
negative value of y which is marginally significant at the .05 level.
By contrast, most of the results reported in this paper are essentially
invariantto the choice of NW or BA as the scale variable; see footnote
16 below for the one other case in which this choice makes a substantive
difference.
15. See also the paper by Harrison and Sharpe in this volume.
16. Defined benefit plans report total assets explicitly on Form 5500
and implicitly (as the difference between liabilities and unfunded
liabilities)on Schedule B. The twoasset measures need not coincide.
For the 1977 sample, the simple correlation between the two is .92 in
the disaggregated sample, and.95in the aggregated sample. The
results reported here and below rely on the asset measure implicit in
Schedule B because it is more likely to be consistent with theliability measure.Here,as in (4), using vested liabilities VL
in place of PL also consistently results in a significant positive
relationship,but with smaller y values. In the regressions of the
form (7) as well as (8) below, replacing NW by BA as the scale
variable typically leads to small (in absolute value) values of 1
of either sign, that are not statistically significant; see again
footnote14.
17.The t—statistic associated with the explicit test of the null hypothesis
=1is 28.2, easily warranting rejection at anyplausibleconfidence
level. For the twosubsample regressionsdescribed inunediately below,
theanalogous t—statistics are 19.2 and11.9,respectively.
18.See especially Oldfield (1977) and FeldsteinandSeligman(1981), as
well as the paper by Feldstein andMorckin this volume.Itis
alwayspossible, of course, that managementsmakedecisions on the
basis of believing that they can affectthe share price in this way
even if that beliefisfalse.
19. These aggregate data are from the Federal Reserve System's flow—of-
fundsaccountsfor yearend 1980. Although the proportions vary over
time, primarily as a result of fluctuations in equity prices, the 1980
values are not atypical.
20. See Pesando (1981) for evidence on beneficiaries' implicit sharing in
these returns, however.
21. See Black (1980) andTepper (1981).
22. This statement abstracts from such factors as risk andmaturity
differences between the debt issued andthedebt held.
23. Forthesubsample of firmswithPA/BA >.03,the value for CY(EBIT)in the equity equation is -.37, with t—statistic —2.5; for the
subsamplewithPA/BA >.10,it is -.75, with t—statistic —2.2.
24. Again this result carried over to all measures of earnings.
25. Thecorrespondingvalues in the PAD and PAO equations were both
negative, though not statistically significant.
26. This distinction between equity investment in the accumulation and
the annuity phases of defined contribution pension plans corresponds
towhat many participants in TIAA-CREF voluntarily elect when they
switchtheir pension reserves from CREFtoTIAA at or near the time
ofretirement.
27. If the observations in the sample corresponded to different dates
for the same firm, thena positive relationship betweenbalance
sheet leverage and pension asset allocations to debt securities
would be evidence that firms behaved over time as Black (1980)
and Tepper (1981) have suggested that they should for tax reasons.
In a cross-section sample, however, no such inference would be
warranted. At most, a positive cross-section relationship would
indicate differences among firms in their extent of implementation
of Black and Tepper's advice.
28. This positive relationship is opposite to what I found in earlier
work based on a limited sample of Form 5500 and related data for
plan year 1976.
29. Using vested liabilities VL in place of PL in (15) does not substan-
tially affect the estimated y values, but does reduce the associated
t—statistics; for the two samples reported above the results based
on VL are, respectively, y =.31,with t-statistic 6.4 (R2 =03),and y =.26,with t—statistic 5.0 CR2 =.07).
30. The variability of the rate of return on equity affects other
liabilities negatively in both the full sample and the PL/TA >.10
subsample.
31. Using vested liabilities VL in place of PL in (17) also consistently
results in a significant positive relationship, but with smaller y
values.
32. These results apply to the Schedule B value of assets. For the Form
5500 asset totals, which need not have the same date as the liabilities
reported in Schedule B, corresponding results are y =.46and=—.32,
with respective t—statistics 8.9 and —4.9 CR2 =.06)for the full
sample, and y =.58and 5= —.40,with respective t—statistics 8.7
and —4.7(R
2=.23)for the subsample.
33. The results for estimating (6) are comparable.
34. As Jay Lightpointsout in his discussion in this volume, there is
also a problem if managements use differing actuarial concepts in
defining pension "liabilities" or, even if a single concept is
used,ifthat concept differs importantly from that assumed here.
The concept of pension "liabilities" used here (as in all of the
previous literature cited above) is the actuarial present discounted
value of accrued obligations for future benefit payments. This
concept is identical to the notion of "actuarial present value of
accumulated plan benefits" as defined by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) in its Statement No. 35, adopted March, 1980
(see especially pp. 6—9). What matters here, however, is what
concepts managements used at the timewhenthey submitted theircompanies' reports for the 1977planyear. thebasisof a close
readingof the pension handbooks and texts available at that time,
as well as the few available surveys of pension actuarial practice,
it is not possible to determine whether —orto what extent
managements relied on the concept used here,which was later
formalizedby FASB-35, or the different net concept suggested by
Light, or yet some other interpretation. The question does bear
importantly on the empirical work in this paper, as well as in
all other empirical studies involving pension liability data before
FASB-35.Re ferences
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